The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken. ZEI Discussion Papers: 2002, C 102 by Vos, Hendrik & Bailleul, Emilie
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 102 
 2002 
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 
Center for European Integration Studies 
Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
Hendrik Voss / Emilie Bailleul 
D
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
 
P
a
p
e
r
The Belgian Presidency and 
the post-Nice process after 
Laeken 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hendrik Vos is professor in European politics at Ghent University, 
Belgium. After studies in political science, he wrote a dissertation on 
the position of the regions in the European Union. He has published  
on European integration history, contemporary issues in European 
politics, regional policy and on international environmental policy. He 
worked in an advisory capacity for several departments of the Flem-
ish government during the preparation of the EU Presidency. 
Emilie Baillieul is a staff member at the department of Political Sci-
ence (Ghent University, Belgium). She is writing a dissertation on the 
role of EU Presidencies in the European architecture. 
 Hendrik Vos / Emilie Baillieul 
 
The Belgian Presidency and the post-
Nice process after Laeken 
 
Introduction 
When the Belgian Presidency of the European Union set off on 1 July 
2001, expectations ran high. The Belgian Presidency was expected to put 
the European train back on the rails, since the European integration process 
was clearly in a slump. 
Various factors have contributed to this general malaise about the way 
Europe was run. To begin with, the Nice summit had aroused mixed 
feelings. Although the Treaty of Nice prepared the Union for enlargement 
mathematically – agreements on vote weighting in the Council, the number 
of members of the European Parliament etc. – many people seriously 
doubted whether a Europe consisting of 27 or 28 member states would be 
able to operate effectively. More in general, some people wonder whether a 
larger Europe will not automatically become a ‘watered down’ Europe. 
Several other factors have contributed to this scepticism. The European 
elections of 1999 were far from a success in terms of turnout, whilst public 
opinion expressed its negative attitude towards the European project in two 
referendums during the first half of 2001: the Danes said ‘nej’ to the euro 
and the Irish said ‘no’ to the Treaty of Nice. 
In addition, the Swedish Presidency ended in a minor key in June 2001: in 
spite of the ambitions of the Göteborg summit, where sustainable 
development was to be placed high on the European agenda, only the 
violent street protest actions will be remembered. 
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Once it had become clear that the negotiations in Nice were not going to 
cause a dramatic change in attitude, Belgium’s prime minister Guy 
Verhofstadt suggested that the Belgian Presidency should be concluded 
with a ‘Declaration of Laeken’ that was to give the debate on the future of 
Europe a new impetus. 
The Belgian Presidency therefore came at a crucial moment for the Union: 
on the one hand, Europe was generally held in low esteem, but on the other 
hand, a debate on Europe’s future might change this negative attitude and 
rekindle enthusiasm through an ambitious project. And the Belgian 
Presidency  was ambitious. This appeared during the presentation of the 
Belgian ‘priority programme’: on 2 May, when the Swedish Presidency 
was still in full swing, the Belgian prime minister presented a programme 
containing sixteen priorities
1. 
 
The present paper examines the outcome of the Belgian presidency and 
how it (possibly) helped to shape the future of Europe. The first part briefly 
describes the general context of the presidency, covering the tasks of the 
presiding member state and the potential influence of the presidency on the 
European agenda. The second part assesses the performance of the Belgian 
Presidency and evaluates the extent to which the Belgian priorities were 
achieved in various areas. An evaluation of the achievements of the Union 
in a wide range of areas can identify future needs and challenges. Some of 
these issues were integrated into the Declaration of Laeken in one form or 
another. We will next examine the Declaration of Laeken and the debate on 
the future of Europe in greater detail. The final part of this paper describes 
the agenda after Laeken. 
 
 
1    “The Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 1 July – 31 December 2001: 
Piorities note”, presented in May 2001. 
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The EU presidency: the context 
It is important to place any European presidency in its proper context. The 
EU presidency is assumed by alternating member states for a six-month 
period. This means that the ministers, diplomats and officials of the 
member state concerned are to preside over the sessions of the European 
Council, the Council of Ministers, Coreper and the hundreds of working 
parties constituting the backbone of the Council. In order to assess the 
significance of a presidency, two issues should be examined: what is 
expected of a presidency, and where does its power reside? 
 
The tasks of a European president 
Firstly, the European president is in charge of organisational and 
administrative-technical affairs: presiding over debates, signing reports and 
conclusions. It is also the president who decides how much time will be 
devoted to an item on the agenda and when to proceed to the vote. 
Secondly, the president lays down the agenda of the meetings. Jointly with 
the Commission, a programme of priorities is developed which serves as a 
basis for the provisional agendas of the Councils. At first sight, it would 
seem that this ‘agenda-setting’ grants the president extensive powers. 
However, this prerogative should be put in its proper perspective – we will 
come back to this when discussing the president’s power and influence. 
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the president is expected to play a 
mediatory role as well. A president should be able to forge compromises, 
and his mediatory proposals should convince as many member states as 
possible and seek the common denominator. In addition, he should act as 
the go-between between the member states and the other institutions. If a 
president succeeds in forcing a breakthrough in difficult issues, this is 
greatly appreciated. A president is expected to be neutral at all times. 
Fourthly, a president also has a representative function. He is the face and 
the mouthpiece of the Union in the media, vis-à-vis the other European 
institutions and on the international scene – during missions, in 
international bodies and at multilateral events. 
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In all these tasks, the president is assisted by the Commission and 
especially by the General Secretariat of the Council, not only technically 
but also substantively. As a matter of fact, the General Secretariat 
constitutes the Council’s ‘memory’: presidents may come and go, but the 
General Secretariat remains. The Secretary-General’s staff help to work out 
compromises and the Secretary-General, who combines this office with 
that of High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
assumes part of the representative task, just like the Commission. 
 
The powers of a president 
As we said above, the president sets the agenda for the meetings. In theory, 
a president can therefore decide autonomously what will and will not be 
discussed. In practice, however, this is hardly ever the case. The daily 
running of Europe cannot be split up in six-month parts. It has its own 
dynamics, and these are to a large extent determined by the rolling 
programme. Especially in the so-called first pillar (where the bulk of 
European activities is still taking place), a legislative proposal can be 
‘pending’ for months, even years. The right of initiative for such issues lies 
with the Commission. A member state itself cannot issue a proposal for a 
directive and place it on the agenda during its presidency. Most files that a 
presidency has to tackle were already launched during earlier presidencies. 
In most cases, a president will simply continue working on proposals that 
are in the pipeline already, at most urging the Commission to put a 
proposal higher on the agenda. 
In addition, the European Council usually gives the president various other 
tasks. When laying down the major policy guidelines for the years to come, 
a timing is often imposed. For instance, in Stockholm (autumn 2000) the 
heads of state and government provided that indicators on labour quality 
and social exclusion were to be submitted before the end of 2001. In some 
cases, these tasks involve an evaluation mission. In Tampere (1999), it was 
decided that Europe was to take initiatives relating to the asylum and 
migration debate, the creation of a European legal area and the fight against 
crime. At the end of 2001 these efforts were to be evaluated. A president 
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has no more impact on these ‘tasks’ than on the rolling programme, and the 
margin for adding a personal touch is quite narrow. In other words, the 
European agenda is governed mainly by its own dynamics, which are 
dissociated from the president’s wishes, demands or priorities. 
However, the situation is somewhat different when the tasks imposed are 
relatively vague. When the Nice European Council provided in December 
2000 that a debate on the future of Europe was to be launched in 2001 and 
that the Declaration of Laeken was to become the first milestone in this 
debate, no one knew what the exact content of this mission was or could 
become. True, four themes were suggested (see below), but they were so 
vague that they were open to divergent interpretations. In such cases, the 
presiding member state can set a personal stamp on the debate and steer it 
in a given direction. However, room for manoeuvre is limited here as well: 
the president is no dictator and has to take the other member states’ 
susceptibilities and willingness to compromise into consideration. Still, it 
was precisely with regard to the Declaration of Laeken that the Belgian 
Presidency was expected (or feared, or requested) to display some 
voluntarism. In the past few decades, Belgian politicians have always 
adopted a pro-European stance and urged for a powerful Europe, including 
stronger institutions, broader competencies etc.
2 This paper will examine 
whether the Belgian Presidency succeeded in steering the debate in a 
specific direction. 
For completeness’ sake we should add that ‘sudden events’ may also affect 
the European agenda. Indeed, the agendas of the Councils may be turned 
upside down all of a sudden, very much against the president’s will. An 
example is the shipwreck of oil tanker Erica, which forced the European 
maritime safety machinery to shift into a higher gear. The nightmare of 
diplomats and of everyone who had meticulously prepared the Presidency 
came true on 11 September. The attacks in New York and Washington, the 
war in Afghanistan and (indirectly) the Middle East crisis had a tremendous 
impact on the European Presidency. This was probably the first time in the 
 
2   See Coolsaet, Rik, “België en zijn buitenlandse politiek 1830-2000”. Leuven, Van 
Halewyck, 2001. All important parties agree that ‘more Europe’ is desirable, 
although opinions differ on a few issues. 
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history of the European integration that the agendas of several Councils 
(General Affairs, Transport, Internal Market, Justice and Domestic 
Affairs…) were affected so dramatically and unexpectedly: the fight 
against terrorism became the sole focus of attention overnight, airline 
companies went bankrupt, humanitarian aid had to be organised urgently, 
joint declarations succeeded one another rapidly… An extra European 
Council was organised in Brussels on 21 September and the planned 
informal European Council in Ghent was largely devoted to these tragic 
events. These experiences have set a stamp on some parts of the Laeken 
Declaration as well. 
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The agenda of the Belgian presidency 
The Belgian presidency’s priorities note covered four themes: internal 
policy, enlargement, external policy and the Laeken Declaration. The 
Laeken Declaration will be covered in the next chapter. The present chapter 
discusses the other priorities. 
 
Internal policy domains 
In the first series of priorities set by the Belgian presidency, continuity is 
the keyword. For instance, the introduction of the euro is presented as one 
of the most important aims, although the Belgian presidency had hardly 
any role to play in this field and the major decisions had been taken earlier. 
In addition, the presidency had set itself the task of elaborating a number of 
social themes. Almost all the goals which were formulated at the beginning 
of the presidency were achieved, partly as a result of the fact that the way 
was already paved to some extent. Above all, the priorities note had made a 
realistic assessment of what was feasible. The extensive European 
experience of several Belgian ministers and officials played an important 
part in this respect. The same applies to the themes relating to the 
environment, public health and sustainable development: the goals were 
achieved without major problems. 
Still, some priorities turn out to have been too ambitious. For example, a 
political agreement regarding the Community patent was not reached, 
whilst in the fiscal-policy area progress was smaller than expected. Those 
decisions had to be taken unanimously in the Council, and the threat of 
vetoes made it very hard to work out a compromise, even though the 
President boasts an excellent reputation when it comes to forging 
compromises. The same problems arose with regard to asylum and 
migration policy. The action programme, which was adopted at Tampere 
(1999), is far from being achieved. The Tampere agreement stipulated that 
progress was to be assessed at the end of 2001, but hardly any successes 
were attained. The Union is still a long way from having a common asylum 
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and migration policy. Conversely, the fight against terrorism has been 
dominating the European agenda ever since 11 September. Some issues 
gained substantial momentum because of external circumstances: it took 
only a few months to virtually achieve the proposal for a decision on the 
European arrest warrant, a list of terrorist organisations was drawn up, an 
agreement was reached on the definition and the punishment of terrorism, 
progress was made in the fight against the financing of terrorism. Besides – 
and this had been planned by the Belgian presidency – an agreement was 
reached regarding the setting up of a definite Eurojust, a permanent unit of 
magistrates with power of enquiry. The purpose of Eurojust is to strengthen 
cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, as well as to 
combat international crime. Before the Belgian presidency started, many 
arrangements had been made and the presidency was able to close this 
issue successfully, except for the allocation of seats. 
 
Enlargement 
During the Belgian presidency, some wide orientation discussions were 
organised about enlargement, notably during the European Councils of 
Ghent and Laeken. Accession negotiations are essentially conducted by the 
Commission, which submits regular progress reports. The Belgian 
presidency found that the roadmap laid down in Nice had been more or less 
respected. During the six-month Belgian presidency, about 40 chapters 
were closed and over 10 chapters opened. In Laeken, the heads of state and 
government joined the Commission in saying that if the present rate of 
progress of the negotiations and reforms in the candidate states is 
maintained, negotiations with ten countries will be concluded successfully 
by the end of 2002. The merit of the presidency lies mainly in its efforts to 
involve the accession candidate countries (often including Turkey) in many 
activities. This gives candidates the ideal opportunity to contribute to the 
workings of the Union. Other presidencies have applied this strategy as 
well. 
 
The external dimensions of the European Union 
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The Belgian priorities note singled out four regions (Russia, the Balkans, 
Central Africa, the Middle East) where intensive activity was envisaged. 
As planned, the presidency presented an action plan for the implementation 
of the EU-Russia common strategy, and there was a European-Russian 
Summit. In the Balkans, a stabilisation and association Treaty was 
concluded with Croatia. The Union agreed to give financial assistance to 
the Central African peace process and undertook efforts to encourage the 
peace talks. However, it was especially the attacks of 11 September that 
determined the Union’s external actions. Overnight, Afghanistan became a 
priority region, whilst the peace process in the Middle East was put in a 
new perspective. An obvious result was the intensification of ties with the 
United States. 
The Union displayed an unprecedented activity, and there was so to speak 
no region in the world that was not visited by the Belgian presidency. At 
the same time it became clear that, politically speaking, the EU is and 
remains a dwarf. During an extraordinary European Council in Brussels 
immediately following the attacks, and also later during the conflict, the 
Union was unanimous in expressing its indignation, but failed to lay 
original accents. The Union simply echoed what Washington said. After 
the attacks and at the outset of operations in Afghanistan, the United States 
engaged in bilateral talks with several Member States, but the EU as a 
whole was rarely consulted, if at all. The large Member States made direct 
arrangements with the United States and barely made an effort to involve 
the Union in their plans. The French-German-British meeting prior to the 
Ghent summit illustrated this perfectly: the presidency was not even 
invited. 
Consequently, it is obvious that the Belgian presidency (and by extension 
the EU as a whole) failed to convey a sense of leadership during the 
conflict. But then, this was not the case during previous major conflicts 
either. The most substantial decisions taken by the Union are probably 
those related to the provision of humanitarian aid to the conflict areas. The 
participation in UN activities in the Afghan region was based on decisions 
taken by individual Member States and cannot be viewed as a joint action 
by the Union. 
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In the Middle East as well, the Union demonstrated its powerlessness. It 
would seem that but for the help of the United States, the Union can 
achieve very little in the region, and Israel finds it very hard to look upon 
the Union as a fully-fledged negotiating partner. The Mideast peace process 
went through many lows during the second half of 2001, and the 
discussions in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership failed 
to remedy this. 
The plans for the European Security and Defence Policy crystallised during 
the Belgian presidency. The events of 11 September probably contributed 
to this development, although the discussions remain laborious. Granted, 
the Union was declared operational in terms of crisis management in 
Laeken (this was yet another of the presidency’s priorities), but given the 
Union’s poor own capacity in many fields, truly joint action will remain 
impossible unless the Union is given access to NATO resources. However, 
first Turkey and then Greece objected, and as a result no agreement with 
NATO was reached. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Union’s external action during the 
Belgian presidency was successful in a number of concrete issues: at the 
racism conference in Durban, the world trade conference in Doha, the 
climate negotiations in Marrakech etc., the EU succeeded in speaking with 
one voice and (sometimes) weighed on the conclusions. 
 
Conclusion 
It is today’s experiences that will shape the debate on the future of Europe. 
It is therefore useful to formulate some conclusions about the events and 
activities marking the Belgian presidency. It was once again demonstrated 
that progress is very slow in issues requiring unanimous voting. Even for 
apparently banal issues (the allocation of seats to agencies), the unanimity 
rule has a paralysing effect, and this is a fortiori true for more important 
decisions. As for its common foreign and security policy, as well as its 
asylum and migration policy, joint actions by the Union were limited. True, 
over a period of several years some progress has been made, but it remains 
doubtful whether these developments will continue after enlargement (see 
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below). As a matter of fact, the current Member States are even now at 
odds about the areas in which the Union must or must not intervene 
actively. We also saw that new instruments replacing strict regulations met 
with general approval. The progress made on a number of social issues, the 
establishment of indicators for sustainable development etc. are examples 
of this development. These are, at least at first sight, relatively 
noncommitting exercises (‘open coordination’, see below), not concrete 
directives or regulations. Finally, a remarkable finding was that the Union’s 
agenda was largely dictated, or at least affected, by external developments, 
as illustrated by the attacks of 11 September and the resulting fight against 
terrorism. 
Recent successes, but especially recent failures, will directly or indirectly 
influence the course Europe has to steer and the consequences this will 
entail. The next part will discuss the debate on the future of the Union in 
greater detail. 
 
   13   Hendrik Vos / Emilie Baillieul 
The debate on the future of Europe 
The fourth chapter of the Belgian priorities note was entitled “The future of 
the European Union: towards an ambitious Declaration of Brussels-
Laeken”. During the six-month Belgian presidency, this debate occupied a 
less prominent place than had been initially projected. This was mainly due 
to the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Before describing the plans of the 
presidency, the proposals that were materialised and the way the debate 
may affect the future of Europe, we should examine the origin of this 
debate. 
 
The consequences of enlargement 
Besides the introduction of the euro, the enlargement is probably the most 
serious challenge facing Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
consequences (financial, institutional) of an enlargement by ten or more 
countries are dramatic – some even refer to the ‘re-establishment’ of 
Europe. The aim of the 1997 Amsterdam Summit was to launch the 
preparation of the Union in view of this enlargement. However, the 
amendments made to the Treaty in Amsterdam were less far-reaching than 
originally expected. True, the decision-making process was made more 
flexible through a simplification of the co-decision procedure. And in 
addition, the number of areas eligible for qualified majority voting was 
increased. Perhaps the most important decision was to enshrine the 
principle of enhanced cooperation in the Treaty. The aim of enhanced 
cooperation is to enable a limited number of Member States that are willing 
and able to advance further, to deepen European integration within the 
single institutional framework, at least within the first, mainly economic 
pillar, and the third pillar (justice and domestic affairs).
3 Still, the 
consensus was that the Union had not been prepared for enlargement in 
Amsterdam. In a number of fundamental bottlenecks, no breakthrough 
 
3   De facto, the idea of enhanced cooperation is not new. In the past a limited number 
of countries moved forward more rapidly than others in some areas, but in principle 
this happened outside the EU (e.g. Schengen), or at least outside the traditional 
institutional framework (e.g. via Euro 11, now Euro 12). 
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appeared to be possible in 1997. The term ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ was soon 
used in the three following areas: the size and composition of the 
Commission, the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council, and the weighting of votes in the Council. Indeed, it was feared 
that the Commission was going to become oversized and that the unanimity 
rule, which still applied in various policy areas, was going to paralyse 
decision-making. The large countries in particular urged for a review of 
votes weighting in the Council. 
As a consequence, a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was 
launched as soon as February 2000 to find a solution to at least these three 
leftovers. This IGC resulted in a new Treaty amendment in Nice in 
December 2000. However, in the run-up to Nice some Member States had 
insisted that the Treaty change should not be confined to the leftovers. For 
instance, several delegations proposed to make the conditions for enhanced 
cooperation more flexible. The talks in Nice were laborious, and it became 
the longest Summit in European history. Afterwards, several Member 
States felt that the EU had only been prepared ‘mathematically’ for 
enlargement. Nice had decided on a review of votes weighting in the 
Council, on the distribution of seats in the European Parliament (for 
applicant countries as well) and so on. These are important issues, to be 
sure, but they do not constitute the core of the matter. The question 
remained whether the EU would still be manageable after enlargement. The 
major challenges facing today’s Europe are related to the external action, 
its asylum and migration policy, its funding, taxation issues, etc. These are 
policy areas where unanimous voting is as yet the rule, and a breakthrough 
in these issues is therefore highly unlikely if 27 or 28 parties can exercise a 
veto. Although Nice decided to abolish the unanimity rule for a number of 
decisions, Member States have retained the right to veto for several 
important (politically sensitive) issues. 
Still, it is only logical that the decision to make the European decision-
making process much more flexible should not be taken lightly. It is no 
using offering Europe a racing bicycle if European politicians have not set 
out the track to be run. It would be unwise to drastically simplify decision-
making in a given policy area if it is decided afterwards that Europe is not 
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to take action in this area. That is why a debate on the future of Europe had 
to be launched first: where do we want Europe to go, what are Europe’s 
goals? In Nice, Belgian prime minister Verhofstadt was one of the most 
fervent advocates of such a debate. It was therefore decided not to close the 
discussion. The ‘Declaration on the future of the Union’ adopted by the 
heads of government calls for a wide and profound debate on the future of 
the EU. It urged the Swedish and Belgian presidencies to launch this 
debate. 
 
The declaration on the future of the Union 
The Nice Declaration steers the debate in a definite direction. It calls for 
broad discussions with all interested parties, representatives of national 
Parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion, political, economic and 
university circles, representatives of civil society, etc. The applicant states 
were also to be involved in the debate in one way or another. In 2004 a new 
IGC was to be convened in order to settle issues on the basis of the results 
of the debate, and to propose new Treaty changes. The Declaration lists 
four themes for the debate: 
1)  “How to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of 
competencies between the EU and the Member States, reflecting the 
principle of subsidiarity”. This theme was suggested by Member 
States feeling that the EU is increasingly interfering in the lives of the 
citizens and is encroaching upon the competence of the Member 
States and their respective regions. The German Länder in particular 
experience this as a problem: they feel that Europe is interfering 
increasingly in their traditional competences, whilst they are incapable 
of halting the process because of the relatively limited impact of the 
regions on the European decision-making process. It is no accident 
that German terms like Kompetenzabgrenzung crop up in discussions 
regularly. 
2)  “The status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights”. In 1999 the 
European Council decided to establish a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in order to make the overriding importance and relevance of 
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these rights more visible to the Union’s citizens. A Convention drafted 
a consensus text that was proclaimed by the heads of state and 
government in Nice. However, the Charter was not enshrined in the 
Treaties, which even failed to refer to it, since this would have granted 
the Charter a legal enforceability that deterred some delegations. 
3)  “A simplification of the Treaties”. The Treaties currently consist of 
countless sections, titles and chapters; besides, there are the different 
pillars, each having its own decision-making procedure. This structure 
can undoubtedly be simplified. However, and more importantly, some 
titles give a detailed description of the extent to which the Union can 
and cannot intervene in specific policy areas. Even a minor change 
would require a Treaty revision. In practice, this would mean 
convening an IGC, during which all the heads of government should 
reach an agreement subsequently to be ratified by the national 
parliaments of all the Member States (for Belgium even the regional 
parliaments). In addition, in some countries a referendum is 
compulsory. In other words, effecting even minor changes in the 
Treaties launches a highly complex and laborious procedure. In the 
long run (and especially after the enlargement), this can make it very 
difficult for the Union to address new challenges rapidly and 
efficiently. Richard von Weizsäcker, Jean-Luc Dehaene and David 
Simon argue that a possible solution could be to separate the Treaties 
into two distinct parts
4. The first part, the basic Treaty, would only 
include the aims, principles and general policy orientations, citizen’s 
rights and the institutional framework. This basic Treaty could only be 
amended unanimously and after a ratification procedure. The second 
part would contain the other provisions of the present Treaties, 
including those relating to specific policies. The amendment 
procedure for these provisions would be much simpler and would not 
require the unwieldy ratification procedure. 
4)  “The role of national Parliaments”. In essence, legislative power 
resides with parliament in all Member States. However, Europe is 
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increasingly playing a legislative role in a wide range of policy areas. 
The national parliaments sometimes feel that they are becoming the 
mere executors of European directives or regulations: Europe sets the 
guidelines, whilst the margins within which parliaments can take 
autonomous legislative action are narrowing. Although the 
parliaments can monitor European activities indirectly in various 
ways, many national parliaments insist on a more prominent role in 
the European architecture. 
 
So Nice laid down the themes that were to be discussed in view of the new 
IGC scheduled for 2004. On 7 March 2001, during the Swedish presidency, 
the official discussion was launched, but it was hard to predict the turn the 
debate would take under the Belgian presidency. A Declaration was to be 
adopted in Laeken containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of 
this process. It was obvious that prime minister Verhofstadt intended to lay 
several new accents in the debate. 
 
The Laeken Declaration 
In its priorities note, the Belgian presidency set itself three tasks with 
regard to the discussion on the future of Europe: “The declaration of 
Laeken must state the agenda  on the debate […], the methods  to be 
employed and the timetable.” [italics by hv, eb] It was not the intention to 
formulate definitive answers as yet, but to give a strong impetus to the 
debate and steer it in a specific direction by raising concrete questions. For 
the preparation of the Declaration, prime minister Verhofstadt was assisted 
by five personal advisers: former Commission president Jacques Delors, 
former prime ministers from Belgium (Jean-Luc Dehaene), Poland 
(Bronislav Geremek) and Italy (Giuliano Amato), and the former adviser to 
British prime minister Blair, David Miliband. 
 
4   Dehaene, Von Weizsäcker, Simon, “The institutional implications of enlargement – 
report to the European Commission”, 18 October 1999. 
18 The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken 
The Laeken Declaration consists of three parts. The first part (“Europe at a 
crossroads”) makes a political analysis of the problems facing the EU, the 
second part describes the agenda and the content of the debate and the final 
part suggests that this discussion should be held in the framework of a 
Convention. 
 
a) The method: a Convention 
The traditional method for preparing Treaty amendments is the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), where representatives of the 
governments meet in private, after which the heads of state or government 
take the ultimate decisions. In the past decade, IGCs succeeded one another 
at a rapid pace, although they generally failed to achieve the desired results. 
The formula has been under attack for some time by many national 
parliaments, public opinion and the representatives of civil society. The 
democratic content, the transparency and sometimes the very legitimacy of 
the IGCs are questioned. After Nice, the avowed aim was to conduct a 
wider debate first. 
Already during the address to the European Parliament marking the 
beginning of the Belgian presidency, prime minister Verhofstadt proposed 
that a Convention should be set up for this purpose, a body elaborating the 
different options or scenarios for the future of Europe. During the informal 
European Council in Ghent (19 October) the heads of state and government 
agreed on this proposal. 
The Convention will consist of a representative of every government, two 
representatives of every national parliament and sixteen representatives of 
the European Parliament, complemented by two representatives of the 
Commission. It was also decided that accession candidate countries will be 
fully involved in the proceedings, without, however, being able to prevent 
any consensus which may emerge among the Member States. It is of great 
symbolic importance that Turkey is accorded the same status as the other 
candidate countries, in spite of the fact that no accession negotiations have 
been opened with Turkey as yet. In addition, observers will be appointed to 
attend the debates: the European Ombudsman, representatives of the 
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Economic and Social Committee, the European social partners and the 
Committee of the Regions. In addition, a Forum will be opened for 
organisations representing civil society. It will take the form of a structured 
network of organisations, and their contributions will serve as input into the 
debate. The Convention will hold its inaugural meeting on 1 March 2002 
and proceedings will be completed after a year, after which the outcome is 
to be presented to the European Council. 
The Convention is a new method for preparing Treaty changes and it may 
therefore seem surprising that such a fundamental innovation was adopted 
relatively smoothly, all things considered – the more so since a number of 
Member States, including Great Britain, were highly critical of this formula 
at the outset of the Belgian presidency. It is therefore worthwhile analysing 
the Convention in greater detail. 
To begin with, the ‘Convention method’ in itself is not new: it was applied 
when the Charter of Fundamental Rights was drawn up. Actually, this 
experience revealed one of the major weaknesses of the Convention: open 
debates and a website failed to trigger off a wide debate in public opinion, 
whilst in most national parliaments (which were represented in the 
Convention) the Charter did not even come up for discussion. Still, the 
Convention preparing the Charter did succeed in presenting a consensus 
document to the heads of state and government. This made it virtually 
impossible for the latter to tamper with the text: the political pressure to 
adopt the text unmodified proved to be too great. It was this very 
experience that made a number of Member States highly sceptical of the 
Convention formula. However, several new mechanisms have now been 
introduced to make sure that the heads of state and government will not be 
presented with a fait accompli. 
Firstly, it was agreed that the heads of state and government were to 
appoint the Chairman of the Convention and that this Chairman was by 
preference to be a former head of government, so that direct contacts could 
be maintained easily. Eventually – and at the insistence of the French 
president – former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was 
appointed as Chairman of the Convention in Laeken. The Chairman, 
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together with the Praesidium, in which the government representatives are 
more strongly represented than in the Convention itself, is given substantial 
powers. 
Secondly, it was decided to provide for a period of reflection between the 
end of the Convention (the exact date has not been set, but it is likely to be 
mid-2003) and the beginning of the IGC (probably in 2004). It was 
especially Great Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries that 
insisted on this period of reflection. The official aim is to give governments 
ample time to consult their parliaments on the position to be taken during 
the IGC, but it is probably also hoped that by inserting this break, a number 
of Convention decisions will be ‘forgotten’, or at least toned down. 
Thirdly, there is the ‘final document’ to be drawn up by the Convention. 
The experience of some Member States with the Convention preparing the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights was not positive because the Convention 
presented a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ consensus document. The Belgian prime 
minister therefore made it clear from the outset that he expected the 
Convention to formulate only a limited number of ‘options’. Pragmatic 
considerations probably played a part in this proposal as well: in a wide 
debate on the future of Europe, a strong consensus is highly unlikely to be 
achieved. One should not harbour too many illusions in this respect: when 
it comes to the reinforcement of the institutions, the issue of foreign and 
security policy, the division of powers etc., the different national 
parliaments will remain divided. However, at the insistence of the 
European Parliament the possibility of formulating a consensus has been 
preserved. The European Parliament fears – probably with good cause – 
that a simple enumeration of options will give the heads of state and 
government free reign and allow them to engage in ‘scenario-shopping’. 
This would greatly reduce the eventual impact of the Convention. The 
Laeken Declaration now states that the Convention “will draw up a final 
document which may comprise either different options, indicating the 
degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is 
achieved.” 
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In summary, we can therefore say that the heads of state and government 
do not have their hands tied and are – in theory at least – in no way 
committed by the proceedings of the Convention. The Laeken Declaration 
is very clear about this: “The final document will provide a starting point 
for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the 
ultimate decisions.” Another remarkable element is the limited involvement 
of the European Commission: although it has two representatives in the 
Convention, it is not mandated to initiate, let alone steer, the debate in a 
‘European spirit’. The role of the Member States (their governments and 
parliaments) remains substantial. 
Two nuances should however be noted. First, two vice-chairmen for the 
Convention were appointed in Laeken: Amato and Dehaene, who were 
members of the group that prepared the Laeken Declaration. This should 
guarantee an in-depth discussion on the themes presented by the Laeken 
Declaration (see below). Second, the dynamic set in motion by the 
Convention should not be underestimated, particularly if the Convention 
should succeed in putting forward consensus proposals. If this occurs, the 
heads of state and government’s room for manoeuvre might be quite 
limited in 2004. In other words, although on paper this is a noncommitting 
exercise, its impact should not be underestimated. Only in 2004 will it 
become clear whether the Convention has triggered off a comprehensive, 
transparent as well as effective process having a strong impact on the future 
of the Union. 
 
b) The content: an open agenda 
It was obvious that the four themes put forward in Nice (see above) had to 
be included in the debate, but the Belgian presidency felt it was not to be 
left at that: “The Belgian Presidency, however, does plan to widen the 
agenda into a comprehensive project for Europe”, the priorities note states. 
Of the four themes agreed on in Nice, only the ‘delimitation of 
competence’ is referred to explicitly in the priorities note, which cites 
various policy areas where ‘more’ Europe would be welcome, particularly 
in the second and third pillars, where progress is hampered by the 
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intergovernmental approach. The priorities note also stated that other 
elements in the debate determine the future of Europe as well: “the 
financing of the EU, the decision-making procedures, the institutional 
architecture and the inter-institutional balance, the role of the regions, the 
Treaty structure, a modernised méthode communautaire and the role of 
social dialogue and of civil society.” The Belgian presidency believed that 
all these themes should be addressed by the Convention. 
Although the Nice Declaration states explicitly that “the process should 
address, inter alia, the following [four] questions” [italics by hv, eb], some 
Member States, including Great Britain and Ireland, insisted that the debate 
should be confined to the four themes agreed on in Nice. Above all, they 
wanted to prevent institutional issues that had already been addressed in 
Nice (e.g. the extension of qualified majority voting) from coming up for 
discussion once again. As a result, the discussions were tough going. 
However, after the French-German summit in Nantes on 23 November, 
France and Germany also appeared to be in favour of a wider agenda 
possibly including fundamental as well as symbolic issues, such as the 
desirability of a European constitution and a new debate on the extension 
of qualified majority voting.
5 The first draft of the Laeken Declaration 
distributed by prime minister Verhofstadt on 25 November, just before he 
started his tour of the capitals, therefore contained more questions than just 
the four issues agreed on in Nice. 
Several delegations, including the French and the British, were critical of 
the draft. However, it had become clear in the meantime that the work of 
the Convention would have no binding effect, at least formally speaking 
(see above). The draft declaration was toned down, a number of questions 
were formulated less rhetorically and the general atmosphere of the text 
lost its federalist edge, but still the Belgian prime minister clung to the idea 
of a very comprehensive agenda. 
The Declaration adopted in Laeken on 15 December contains four sections 
that do not coincide with the four themes agreed on in Nice. The four 
 
5    “Déclaration conjointe sur les grandes priorités Européennes”, Sommet franco-
allemand, 23 November 2001. 
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themes from the Nice Declaration were of course incorporated into the 
Laeken Declaration, but they were placed in a much broader context. The 
four sections are: 
1)  “A better division and definition of competence in the European 
Union”. This section does refer explicitly to an issue from the Nice 
Declaration. The questions it presents cover the way in which the 
division of competence can be made more transparent and how it 
relates to the principle of subsidiarity. This discussion is geared into a 
specific direction from the start, since the question is raised whether 
Europe shouldn’t be involved more actively in foreign and defence 
policy, and how cooperation with regard to police and criminal law, 
but also social inclusion, the environment, health and food safety can 
be improved. On the other hand, it is added that Europe must not 
‘regulate’ everything and should respect the competences of Member 
States ànd regions. In other words, how can a balance be achieved in 
which the European dynamic does not come to a halt, whilst avoiding 
an encroachment upon the areas of competence of the Member States 
and their regions? 
2)  “Simplification of the Union’s instruments”. The key question in this 
section is whether the Union’s instruments should not be better 
defined and whether their number should not be reduced. Should the 
Member States be given more room for manoeuvre in achieving 
policy objectives? And for which areas of competence is ‘open 
coordination’, in which no compulsory regulations are issued but 
political and moral pressure is exerted on the Member States, the most 
appropriate instrument? 
3)  “More democracy, transparency and efficiency”. This section raises 
the question as to how the institutions can be made more democratic. 
A remarkably direct question relates to the appointment of the 
President of the Commission: by the European Council, the European 
Parliament or through direct elections by the citizens? Questions are 
also raised about the election of the European Parliament and 
transparency within the Council. The place of the national parliaments 
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in the European architecture (A Second Chamber monitoring 
subsidiarity?), the structure and the future role of the various Council 
formations and the use of the rotating Presidency are the themes of 
other questions. Other noteworthy issues, which were undoubtedly 
affected by the events of 11 September, relate to the Union’s external 
policy: “How should the coherence of European foreign policy be 
enhanced? […] Should the external representation of the Union in 
international forums be extended further?” However, probably the 
most striking element in this section is the fact that questions to which 
the Treaty of Nice formulated an (apparently unsatisfactory) answer 
are put on the table again, for instance whether or not the extension of 
qualified majority voting is desirable. 
4)  “Towards a constitution for European citizens”. Two issues from the 
Nice Declaration (the simplification of the Treaties and the statute of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights) are included in this section. The 
question whether a distinction between a basic Treaty and the other 
Treaty provisions (see above) is desirable is raised explicitly. 
However, the most innovating question is whether a simplification and 
reorganisation of the Treaties should in the long run result in a 
European constitution. 
 
In summary, we can say that the Laeken Declaration covers a very wide 
array of themes. In addition, it raises questions that were never before 
raised as explicitly by the heads of state or government (e.g. the desirability 
of a constitution). Although not all questions indicate the same course, the 
formulation of many of the questions is quite suggestive. In short, the 
Belgian presidency has achieved its intention of widening the agenda set in 
Nice and launching a broad debate about the future of the EU. However, 
we should again emphasise that – at least on paper – this process is 
noncommitting. 
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After Laeken 
What the future of Europe will look like remains uncertain, even after 
Laeken. Not before the next Treaty revision – which will probably coincide 
with the first wave of new accessions – will we have an indication of where 
Europe is heading. As we said above, a comprehensive debate has been 
launched in which diverse questions are tackled. This final part highlights a 
number of developments that will determine the future of the Union and 
need to be followed closely. 
•  Firstly, the activities of the Convention should be monitored: it remains 
to be seen whether this body will succeed in answering all the questions 
raised. There is no telling to what extent a consensus will be reached. 
Although the odds for a broad consensus are small – the Convention is 
probably too heterogeneous – it is by no means certain that the result will 
be confined to a diffuse (and hence gratuitous) enumeration of divergent 
scenarios. An interesting element to monitor will certainly be the role 
played by the Commission. Owing to its expertise, it may succeed in 
transcending its – theoretically limited – role and weigh on the final 
result. However, it is hardly likely that the major bones of contention 
with the Member States will be settled in the Commission’s favour. 
Particular attention should be paid to the treatment of the institutional 
questions, to the issue of the Treaties, and to the shape that the 
delimitation of competence will take. As far as the institutional issues are 
concerned, it is generally assumed that an enlarged Union risks 
foundering in areas where unanimity rule prevails and where every 
Member State has a right to veto. The introduction of the Community 
method (with the right of initiative resting with the Commission, the 
Council voting by majority) on a large scale would guarantee stronger 
European action. However, this also implies that the Member States 
should relinquish more sovereignty to Europe. This is a highly sensitive 
issue, politically speaking, especially in areas that have been 
controversial for years (foreign and defence policy, fiscal policy, social 
security etc.). With regard to the statute of the Treaties, the Laeken 
Declaration launches a process that may result in a European 
constitution, but it is open to doubt whether the Convention will continue 
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the course that has been steered so far. If the Treaties are not split up and 
retain their current form, effecting Treaty changes in an enlarged Union 
will become virtually impossible. This may seriously undermine the 
dynamic of the integration process. Finally, as far as the delimitation of 
competence is concerned, it is uncertain what the exact surplus value is 
of a clear-cut division of activities among the EU, the Member States 
and, where applicable, the regions. Is it feasible at all to draw up a 
catalogue in a political arena characterised by ‘multi-level governance’? 
A fixed catalogue would also make it virtually impossible to address new 
challenges quickly and efficiently. Conversely, greater clarity on the 
division of competence may contribute to increased transparency and 
remove distrust. The drafting of a flexible catalogue is an option that will 
certainly be considered. As we noted earlier, there are those who fear 
that if no limits are agreed upon, the Union will surreptitiously extend its 
power and pose a threat to states and regions alike. Others fear that 
Kompetenzabgrenzung  is a weapon that will curtail the influence of 
Europe drastically. The confrontation of these divergent views makes for 
a highly interesting and unpredictable debate. 
•  Besides, it will be crucial to accurately assess the role of the accession 
candidate countries in this debate. It is becoming increasingly likely that 
about ten countries will join the Union in 2004. Consequently, they will 
have their say during the next IGC and may have to ratify a new Treaty. 
However, already in the Convention these countries will have to show 
their colours: what exactly do they expect of Europe? Will a large 
internal market – with structural funds thrown in with the bargain – be 
sufficient or do they wish to become part of a political Europe that has a 
voice in the world and pursues a common policy in several areas? The 
answer to this question is hard to predict. The candidate countries will 
probably reject a Europe coming with a high price tag (e.g. because of a 
far-reaching social or environmental policy) if this is not compensated 
by corrective action. And after decades of policymaking directed from 
Moscow, many countries remain wary of a Brussels busybody. 
•  Thirdly, attention should be paid to the attitude of the actors that have 
been participating in the debate on the future of Europe for some time 
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now. National parliaments, constitutional regions, social partners and the 
anti-globalist movement will inevitably exert an influence because they 
will take part in the activities of the Convention in one way or another; 
but even outside the Convention they will help to shape the debate and 
create a specific atmosphere. It remains to be seen whether (part of) civil 
society will turn away from Europe and defect to the eurosceptics, or 
engage a large-scale movement in the opposite direction, with a plea for 
more Europe (social, environmental, fiscal etc.). 
•  In close connection with the previous point, it will be important to 
establish whether and how the citizens feel involved in the European 
project. For years on end, opinion polls have shown that many 
Europeans are indifferent, sceptical or even hostile to the Union. Even 
the grandest schemes will flounder if they are not rooted in the people 
and if they lack legitimacy. Whether the presence of two representatives 
from all the national parliaments in the Convention will give the average 
European citizen a feeling of greater involvement in Europe is by no 
means certain. They might become more interested if it were decided to 
have the Commission president elected directly, or to work (partly) with 
European lists for the Parliamentary elections. In this context, the effect 
of the euro as a day-to-day symbol of European identity is expected to be 
even more dramatic. 
•  Internal developments within the Member States will also affect the 
discussions in the Convention or in the IGC, thus directly determining 
the future of the Union. With general elections ahead (for example in 
France and Germany), politicians tend to focus on national issues and 
shift away from Europe. Specific sensibilities (e.g. relating to the role of 
the regions in Europe) may also steer the debate in a certain direction. 
Not to forget Great Britain, where prime minister Blair is trying hard to 
make citizens enthusiastic about the euro. It is far from certain, however, 
that his campaign will succeed; it might even backfire and boost British 
scepticism vis-à-vis Brussels. There is equal uncertainty about the 
position of Ireland, where the population rejected the Nice Treaty in a 
first referendum. In other Member States as well, national themes or 
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interests will undoubtedly play a decisive role in determining the 
country’s view of the future of the Union. 
•  The impact of external events should not be underestimated either. The 
terrorist attacks in the United States turned the fight against terrorism 
into a European top priority overnight. It has repeatedly been shown that 
external events affect and sometimes even dictate the European agenda 
(so the agenda of the Convention as well). 
•  Another question is what will be done with the results  of the 
Convention: to what extent will the IGC, which is likely to be convened 
in 2004, act upon the Convention’s decisions? The heads of government 
will not start from scratch when elaborating the next Treaty revision, but 
will they feel bound by the results of the Convention? 
•  Finally, it will be interesting to follow how Europe will manage with its 
current instruments in the months and years to come. The second pillar 
provides the Union with several instruments for pursuing a common 
foreign policy, including joint actions. The question is whether these 
specific instruments will enable the Union to act as a credible partner 
worldwide. In the past few years, the Union has been applying new 
methods focusing on concepts such as benchmarking, the exchange of 
best practices etc.: goals are set and guidelines proposed (e.g. for 
employment, social inclusion etc.), but it is up to the Member States 
themselves to determine how they will achieve these goals. A Member 
State that does not reach a goal will not be punished, but scoreboards 
will be maintained. This ‘name, blame and shame’ strategy is expected 
to put pressure on Member States that are lagging behind. The next few 
years will tell whether or not this ‘open coordination method’ is effective 
and gives an adequate incentive to all Member States in view of 
achieving the ultimate goals. They will also indicate how this method 
relates to the traditional legal instruments: does open coordination pave 
the way for ‘tight regulations’ or will this method systematically replace 
directives and regulations in some policy areas? Or is enhanced 
cooperation to become the method of the future? It was an option 
provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty, but it has never been 
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implemented. It is sometimes argued that enhanced cooperation will play 
an important role in an enlarged Europe, so this mechanism might 
shortly be used in cases where a large majority of Member States want to 
go further than the remaining minority (e.g. with regard to fiscal issues). 
The coming months and years will tell whether Member States are 
indeed prepared to take this step, which will create a multi-speed Europe. 
It will be of capital importance to analyse the consequences of enhanced 
cooperation: does it create a vanguard, a group of countries 
systematically moving forward jointly (thus creating a core Europe) or a 
Europe à la carte, in which different countries in turn commit 
themselves to enhanced cooperation? The latter scenario would not 
benefit transparency and would create great uncertainty. 
 
We have so far examined the elements and developments that (will) impact 
upon the debate about the future of Europe and affect its outcome. It is 
obvious that other factors will play a role as well. In its study on what 
Europe could look like in twenty years’ time, the British Federal Trust 
attempted to detect the ‘driving forces’ behind European politics
6. This 
study suggests four crucial factors: demographic developments, 
technological progress, globalisation and the importance of ideology. It 
goes without saying that these and probably many other factors as well will 
determine the climate in which the debate will be conducted. 
Summarising, we can say that there are numerous question marks left. And 
we have not even covered many other questions (what are the borders of 
Europe?; how many members can the EU handle? etc.). In short, 
uncertainty about the future of Europe reigns. Today, economic unification 
(the internal market, agriculture, external trade) has been largely achieved, 
with the euro as the crowning glory. In the past half century, it was often 
hard to predict when a certain step would be taken, but the overall course 
was generally clear. But what about after today? In the past few months 
and years different tracks were explored and summit meetings were held 
 
6   Duff, A., Williams, S., “European futures. Alternative scenarios for 2020”, London, 
Federal Trust, 2001. 
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about employment, the new economy, social cohesion, asylum and police 
cooperation. Various commitments were made in the field of defence and 
security policy, and we recently even witnessed the beginnings of a ‘fiscal 
Europe’. In other words: many new roads are possible in Europe and 
cautious commitments have been made already. But integration is slow in 
these areas, not in the least because of unwieldy decision-making 
procedures. It is therefore impossible to predict what courses will be 
pursued in the coming years. This is not the occasion to dwell on the 
countless scenarios for the future that have been written, defended, feared 
or rejected in the past few years by the governments and by the numerous 
interest groups and think tanks – from a disintegrating Europe to a United 
States of Europe. 
The key question is whether the debate that is launched now will lead to the 
definition of clear-cut goals: what course should be pursued in the 21st 
century? Is the ambition to create a political Europe lacking? Will the 
enlarged Union be no more than a sizeable free-trade area with open 
coordination as the central policy instrument, with some Member States 
committing themselves to enhanced cooperation on an à la carte basis? Or 
is the desire to go further so great with some Member States that a 
vanguard will be created, with a Union shaped according to the Saturn 
model: concentric circles around a core consisting of a small number of 
countries that keep integrating systematically in various areas, possibly 
taking along the rest of the Union in their stride? 
Europe has truly reached a defining moment in its history. During the next 
years, crucial choices will have to be made. Together with the Union’s 
enlargement, decisions will be taken that will profoundly change the face 
of the Union. It will not be an easy discussion: in the past few years, 
Europe has often resembled a crackleware vase, with cracks between large 
and small, between advocates of a federal structure and proponents of 
national sovereignty, between those in favour of rapid enlargement and 
those who prefer to wait, between those who want to pursue a social course 
and others who want a European army first, and so on. Europe has become 
a tangle of fault lines. 
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With its relatively ambitious Laeken Declaration and the rhetorical 
questions it raised, the Belgian presidency intended to steer the discussion 
in a specific direction. However, this has not resolved differences of 
opinion. In 2004 at the earliest will it become clear whether the Laeken 
Declaration will be a mere footnote in European history books, or a 
separate chapter. 
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